Prior studies find significant reactions in credit markets, but not in the equity market, to SOX 404 internal control disclosures. Because creditors' expected recovery, the complement of expected loss given default, affects creditors but not equity-holders, it could provide a unique angle to understand such differential findings. Using credit default swaps (CDS) and expected default frequency (EDF) data, we estimate the expected recovery component in CDS spreads. We find that creditors' expected recovery is significantly lower for firms reporting internal control material weaknesses. This effect concentrates among firms with high default risk where the concern for recovery is most relevant. Furthermore, creditors' expected recovery is only sensitive to the more severe type of (company-level) internal control material weaknesses.
Introduction
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on internal control ("SOX 404") is among the most important regulations on financial reporting. Many have examined the effect of internal control quality on the cost of capital. While prior studies using both public bonds and private loans show that weak internal control increases the cost of debt, the evidence on the cost of equity is mixed. 1 While the intrinsic link between equity and debt of the same firm suggests that the cost of debt and the cost of equity share many common determinants, the asymmetric claims of debt and equity to the firm's cash flows could contribute to the differential effects of internal control quality on the cost of capital in these two markets. In particular, when a firm's asset value drops below the default boundary, cash flow news is of little relevance to equity-holders, but remains important to debt-holders, as the recovery upon default becomes a crucial consideration for credit investors.
Given that internal control disclosures have more downside implications, it is likely that the credit market will have a stronger response than the equity market. Internal control quality is essential to credit investors and their expected recovery upon default in two ways. First, material weaknesses in a firm's internal control cast doubts on the reliability and accuracy of its financial reports. In such cases, uncertainty about the company's creditworthiness and liquidation value is high. 2 Second, low quality of financial reporting exacerbates creditor-shareholder conflicts, as the expropriation of debt-holders by equity-holders may be harder to detect. Ineffective internal controls thus could lead to lower expected recovery for creditors. In this paper we use a novel dataset on credit default swaps (CDS) and Expected Default Frequency (EDF™) to empirically examine the unique role of expected recovery for creditors in the effect of internal control quality on the cost of debt.
Credit default swaps are insurance-like derivative contracts against losses from credit events such as default and bankruptcy. The CDS market provides a suitable setting to conduct our empirical analysis, because CDS spreads are directly observable and not contaminated by covenants and embedded options that often affect bond and loan spreads. Callen et al. (2009) provide detailed discussions on the advantages of CDS data. Moreover, the CDS market tends to lead the bond market in price discovery (Blanco et al. 2005) , while bond spreads usually contain a sizable liquidity component beyond credit risk (Longstaff et al. 2005) . Given the trillion-dollar notional value outstanding after a rapid growth in market size, CDS trading plays a critical role in the credit market. 3 In our study we utilize transactions data on CDS contracts rather than nontradable dealer quotes to accurately capture market reactions to internal control disclosures.
We first find via event studies that CDS spreads react significantly to internal control disclosures but equity returns do not. Moreover, the CDS reaction comes primarily from low credit rating firms, for which the expected recovery upon default is an important concern to creditors. This finding is consistent with the insight of Callen et al. (2009) . In multivariate regressions, we find a significant relation between CDS spreads and internal control quality only for firms with low expected recovery proxied by high intangibles, low profit margin, or low industry recovery rate. These results demonstrate the importance of investigating the expected recovery in order to better understand the effect of internal control quality on cost of debt.
Our main analysis henceforth focuses on the expected recovery for creditors. Creditors' expected recovery upon default can be deduced from CDS spreads and the probability of default of the underlying firm. We use the popular Moody's KMV Expected Default Frequency (EDF™) to measure the default probability of reference firms, and estimate the expected recovery component as the CDS component unrelated to EDF. In the reduced-form approach, we regress CDS spreads on EDF for each industry in each year. The part of CDS spreads unexplained by EDF corresponds to the expected loss given default, and we use this part to represent the expected recovery component of the CDS spreads. Alternatively, we use a structural approach to come up with a zero-recovery CDS spread. The difference between the zero-recovery and actual CDS spreads captures the contribution of the expected recovery to CDS prices. Both of our expected recovery measures are significantly negatively associated with internal control quality.
That is, the expected recovery measure is higher for firms without material weaknesses (MW) in their internal controls.
In our cross-sectional analysis, we find that the effect of internal control material weaknesses on the expected recovery is concentrated in high default risk firms, for which the concern for recovery is more pertinent. To further understand the channel for internal control quality to affect the expected recovery, we examine the relation between severities of internal control MWs and the expected recovery. When a MW is more severe, it is easier for equityholders to misappropriate firm assets. In such a case, the recovery value is expected to be lower.
We indeed find that only the more severe company-level MWs matter to the expected recovery component. The less severe account-specific MWs have no significant effect on expected recovery value. Moreover, we document that CDS spreads also only depend on company-level MWs, but the default probability component is affected by both types of MWs. This finding suggests that the differential effect of MW severity on CDS spreads is a consequence of its differential effect on the expected recovery component.
We make three contributions to the literature. First, we highlight the role of the expected recovery in understanding the differential impact of internal control quality on the cost of capital for debt and equity. Our analysis provides prevailing evidence on the positive association between the quality of internal controls and creditors' expected recovery upon default. Our finding confirms the unique role of the expected recovery channel in the effect of internal control quality on the cost of debt, which may be absent in the consideration for the cost of equity. This perspective of the expected recovery helps us understand the differential responses from the equity market vis-à-vis the credit market regarding the effect of internal control quality on the cost of capital. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the unique role of creditors' recovery expectation in terms of the relevance of financial reporting quality to debtholders. Our study hence provides an alternative mechanism for internal control to affect the cost of debt. 4 Second, we provide the first evidence from an important derivative market on the benefits of having high quality internal control. Our paper adds to the empirical studies in accounting, initiated by Callen et al. (2009) , in utilizing CDS spreads as a more accurate measure of credit spreads. Third, we provide a method to identify the expected recovery component from the CDS and EDF data. This method can be useful for other debt market studies on the role of the expected recovery.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a background on the CDS market and SOX 404 and discusses empirical implications of the expected recovery.
Section 3 describes our sample and motivating evidence for focusing on the expected recovery.
Section 4 presents our main analysis on the effect of internal control quality on the expected recovery component of CDS spreads. Section 5 concludes.
Background and Related Studies
In this section, we first briefly introduce the CDS market and provide a concise description of SOX 404. Then we discuss implications of SOX 404 disclosures for the expected recovery for creditors in the CDS market.
The Credit Default Swaps Market and Related Studies
Credit default swaps can be thought of as insurance contracts protecting credit claims. In a CDS transaction, the protection seller agrees to compensate the protection buyer if a credit event of a reference issue occurs before the contract expiration. For this credit protection, the buyer pays the seller a fee similar to an insurance premium. The annualized fee for a CDS contract is referred to as the CDS spread or the CDS price. Unlike bonds and loans, which bundle different types of risk together, a CDS contract strips out other types of risk such as interest rate risk and exchange rate risk. Hence, CDS trading focuses exclusively on credit risk.
CDS contacts are the primary financial instrument for credit risk transfer.
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Major participants in the CDS market are large commercial banks, insurance companies, and hedge funds. CDS spreads are often cited as a timely barometer of the financial health of a reference firm or sovereign entity. Recent empirical research on credit risk increasingly relies on CDS 5 If we assume that the U.S. market accounts for 40% of the global CDS market based on the estimate by ISDA, then the notional amount of outstanding CDS contracts in the US by the end of 2007 was $24.8 trillion, which is much larger in scale than the size of the U.S. corporate bond market standing at $5.9 trillion at the same time, according to Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA). contracts, as Longstaff et al. (2005) suggest that CDS spreads are a superior measure of credit spreads, and Blanco et al. (2005) find that the CDS market leads the bond market in the price discovery of credit risk. Callen et al. (2009) 's paper is the first accounting study using CDS data. They find that accounting earnings are priced in CDS spreads for both levels and changes. De Franco et al. (2009) show that CDS prices are responsive to debt analysts' reports. Shivakumar et al. (2011) document that CDS spreads react significantly to management forecasts. Arora et al. (2011) examine the effect of asset measurement uncertainty on the term structure of CDS spreads for financial firms. Bhat et al. (2011) demonstrate that the information content of earnings for CDS pricing is not affected by IFRS adoptions. Moreover, Lok and Richardson (2011) discuss the connections between credit and equity markets and argue for thoughtful empirical designs taking advantage of unique characteristics of CDS data.
Internal Control over Financial Reporting (SOX 404) and the Cost of Capital
We examine internal control reports mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404 (SOX 404). Prior to SOX in 2002, U.S. companies were required to disclose internal control effectiveness only occasionally (e.g., in the event of an auditor termination). Since November 15, 2004, SOX 404 requires U.S. publicly traded companies to disclose internal control effectiveness over financial reporting ("internal control quality") as "a process designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes …" (PCAOB AS #2), since SOX internal control disclosures have to be attested to by management and external auditors. Broad discussions of SOX and 6 Section 404 has been one of the most controversial provisions of SOX regulation because of its high costs of compliance. In response to this controversy, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued several market reactions around the event are available in Li et al. (2008) and Zhang (2007) . In addition, Lu et al. (2011) discuss different internal control disclosure practices in Canada.
As Dechow et al. (2010) and Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) suggest, the internal control quality disclosure is an objective and unambiguous external proxy for financial reporting quality. Internal control disclosures are directly observable, while other financial reporting quality measures rely on estimation models. Those firms reporting internal control weakness tend to be small, young, risky and financially weak (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007b; Ge and McVay 2005) .
Internal control quality could have an important impact on the cost of capital, although the evidence from the equity market based on SOX 404 is mixed. On one hand, Ogneva et al. (2007) find no association between internal control MWs and the cost of equity after controlling for other firm characteristics. Beneish et al. (2008) also document that the equity market does not react strongly to Section 404 internal control weakness disclosures. On the other hand, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) show that internal control weaknesses are associated with higher cost of equity, but their data include both SOX 302 and SOX 404 disclosures.
Several recent studies have examined the relation between internal control quality and the cost of debt using data on public bonds or private loans. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) find that corporate bond spreads are marginally higher for firms disclosing internal control MWs, and this relationship between bond spreads and internal control quality is weaker for firms monitored by banks. Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) and Kim et al (2011) document that bank loan spreads are higher for firms reporting internal control MWs. These studies reach a consensus that the cost of debt is higher for firms with MWs, albeit arguing with different underlying mechanisms for their findings. It is not clear, however, whether their conclusions will hold in the CDS market. For instance, firms with CDS contracts are generally large and well monitored (Ashcraft and Santos 2009) . Therefore, the impact of internal control quality on CDS spreads should be limited according to the monitoring mechanism of Dhaliwal et al. (2011) . On the other hand, Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) and Kim et al. (2011) suggest even for firms monitored by banks, the effect of internal control quality on credit spreads is still significant.
There are key differences between CDS contracts and public bonds/bank loans. CDS contracts are derivative securities with zero net supply, and their payoffs are driven exclusively by the expected loss. In contrast, the value of a bond or a loan depends on not only the expected loss, but also interest rate risk and other types of market risk. Therefore, CDS spreads should reflect more clearly the market assessment of the expected loss. Hence, examining the effect of internal control disclosures in the CDS market will help clarify the conflicting evidence on the impact of internal control disclosures on the cost of capital.
Creditors' Expected Recovery upon Default and Internal Control Quality
The expected loss is determined by the probability of default and the loss given default.
While default probability affects both equity and debt, the expected recovery is only important for credit investors. This concern for the expected recovery upon default is particularly pertinent to internal control quality as the disclosure of material weaknesses matters more for downside risk, and thus credit investors should be more sensitive to such disclosures. Therefore, we expect that the relationship between CDS spreads and internal control quality is stronger for firms with recovery concerns.
The consideration for expected recovery could also help reconcile the differential findings of internal control effects from equity and debt markets (i.e., weak in equity and strong in debt), which appear puzzling given the fundamental linkages between equity and debt, as delineated by Lok and Richardson (2011) . The option pricing framework --equity as a call option on firm value with exercise price equal to debt value --predicts that the credit market is less sensitive to cash flow news than the equity market. But this view is applicable only under normal circumstances when the deep-in-the-money equity captures the upside potential of the firm value. For the downside risk to which internal control quality is most relevant, the expected recovery upon default becomes a determining factor separating equity and debt, as equity will be an out-of-money option on the firm's assets and hence insensitive to internal control quality once the firm value drops below a threshold.
There are two potential drivers for a significant relationship between internal control quality and the expected recovery. First, material weaknesses in internal control reduce the information quality in financial reports. Hence, the expected liquidation value will be lower for risk-averse creditors facing such uncertainty. Second, internal control material weaknesses may facilitate the misappropriation of firm value by equity-holders, exacerbating the conflicts between equity-holders and debt-holders. We will empirically examine such relationships in our empirical analysis below.
Data and Exploratory Results
In this section, we first describe our sample selection and provide summary statistics. We then illustrate the differential reactions of credit and equity markets to internal control disclosures. Subsequently, we demonstrate the necessity to explore the role of expected recovery upon default in CDS spreads by providing several sets of empirical results.
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Our dataset is drawn from the intersection of SOX 404 disclosures and CDS transactions for U.S. firms. Credit default swap data are from GFI Group. Section 404 internal control reports are compiled by Audit Analytics. Financial and accounting information is from CRSP and We require CDS transaction data over the sample period for firms disclosing internal control quality. Our main CDS dataset comes from GFI Group, a leading CDS market interdealer broker that Risk magazine has ranked as the number-one credit broker every year since 1998. The data, captured by GFI's CreditMatch electronic and voice hybrid trading system, include all transacted prices and tradable quotes in basis points with varying maturities for a reference company (or "name"). Unlike other data sources, the GFI dataset consists of only real market prices and tradable quotes, as dealers and traders commit capital when submitting quotes to the trading system. We augment the GFI data with CDS trades and quotes from CreditTrade, another major interdealer broker until 2006. CreditTrade data were previously used by Blanco et al. (2005) and Acharya and Johnson (2007) . The combined GFI and CreditTrade data provide a comprehensive coverage of the CDS market.
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The unique transaction data are critical to the analysis of CDS pricing and its components.
First, transaction data are more accurate than the indicative quotes used in most extant empirical studies on credit trading. Hence, CDS spreads based on actual transactions represent the best measure of the current market assessment of credit risk. Second, the high frequency of the data is helpful for capturing changing market views and critical for our event analysis. Prior studies on credit trading use either bond trading recorded by TRACE or syndicated loan transactions in the secondary market, but those markets are less liquid than the CDS market (Callen et al. 2009 ).
Third, firms usually have multiple bonds and loans outstanding with different terms and conditions. Such heterogeneity gives rise to econometric challenges for empirical designs using bond and loan data. basis points higher than firms with effective internal controls, on average. This difference is statistically significant at the one-percent level. The comparison of medians illustrates a similar difference. This difference, however, may not be entirely attributable to the difference in internal control quality, as these two groups of firms are quite different in other aspects. Firms with internal control MWs have higher levels of credit risk than firms with effective internal controls, as demonstrated by the significant difference in stock volatility and leverage, which are the main determinants of credit risk. Altman's Z-scores, which mainly use accounting information to measure credit risk, also show that MW firms are of lower credit quality.
Differential Reactions from CDS and Equity Markets to Internal Control Disclosures
We investigate market reactions to SOX 404 internal control disclosures with material weaknesses in both CDS and equity markets. We expect differential reactions from these two markets for the following reasons. First, while Beneish et al. (2008) find that stock prices do not significantly react to SOX 404 material weakness disclosures, 10 we expect that the CDS investors react negatively to the MW disclosures since MWs indicate greater downside risk to creditors.
CDS investors may be concerned with the expected recovery value upon default in the presence of MWs due to the consideration of information quality and equity-debt conflicts. Second, CDS investors are arguably more sophisticated institutional investors and hence should be more apt to decipher the information associated with internal control disclosures.
To conduct our short-window investigation, we search for relevant news items through 10K Wizard and Factiva to determine the date of the disclosure of internal control quality in the period starting from ninety days prior to the filing date of internal control reports for firms disclosing material weaknesses in our sample. For these event dates, we estimate the CDS spread percentage changes over the three-day event window (-1, +1). We also calculate the cumulative stock returns in the same event window. Our estimation of the CDS spread change follows Shivakumar et al. (2011) . Table 2 reports results for our event studies. CDS transaction data over the (-1, +1) event window are available for 46 internal control disclosures reporting material weaknesses.
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For all the MW events with available trading data, we find that CDS spreads increase by 2.62%, on average, around the disclosure window. This increase is significant at the 5% level (t-stat=1.93 corresponding to one-tailed p=0.03). In contrast, we find no significant reaction from stock prices. Our findings on stock returns are consistent with Beneish et al. (2008) in that there is no significant evidence for the stock market reaction to Section 404 MW events.
As suggested by Callen et al. (2009) , the nonlinearity of creditor payoff functions affects the CDS market reaction to financial information. In our setting, such nonlinearity implies that creditors react more to information that delivers potential losses when firms are close to bankruptcy. We, thus, conduct the event studies for high credit quality firms and low credit quality firms respectively by using the median of credit rating to separate the sample. The second row of Table 2 shows that the CDS reaction is prominent in the low credit rating subsample with statistical significance at one-percent level. For high credit rating firms, in contrast, CDS spreads do not significantly react to internal control MW disclosures. These findings suggest that the material weakness news is more relevant to creditors than to equity holders, in particular, when the expected recovery of firms becomes a concern. 13 may be complicated by estimation errors. In unreported robustness checks using CDS raw changes or using abnormal CDS spread changes adjusted by the market spread change, we find similar results. 12 Since we require CDS spread data to be available in the event windows, the event studies only include 46 MW events which are smaller than 74 MW disclosures reported in Panel C of Table 1 . When we only use firms' firsttime MW disclosures, the results, which are available upon request, are similar. The size of this sample is smaller with 33 events. Nevertheless, the CDS price reaction is still economically and statistically significant. Again, there is no significant stock reaction in this subsample. 13 One conjecture about no reaction in the equity market is that the equity market might lead the CDS market and incorporate the MW news before the disclosure dates. However, such an alternative explanation is inconsistent with previous findings that the CDS market leads the equity market in compounding negative information (Acharya and Johnson 2007; Longstaff et al. 2005; Blanco et al. 2005) . Moreover, the significant reaction of the CDS market closely around the disclosure date suggests that the MW disclosures provide new information to the sophisticated investors in this credit derivative market.
The asymmetric payoff structures between equity and debt (equity captures the upside and debt captures the downside of firm value) may suggest a significant negative stock market reaction for high credit rating firms. However, we do not find such results. Therefore, the mere equity-debt asymmetry may not be sufficient for understanding the differential findings on the cost of capital. In this regard, the expected recovery upon default may prove to play a crucial and unique role in the divergent behavior of debt and equity as it directly affects the pricing in the credit market (e.g., CDS, bonds, and loans) while exerts a minimal impact on equity. Moreover, as we emphasize, the equity holder-debt holder conflict may be exacerbated by internal control weaknesses, in that equity-holders could gain from wealth transfer activities which are easier with weak internal controls. In the next subsection we further analyze the role of expected recovery upon default in CDS spreads.
The Effect of Internal Control Quality on CDS Spreads: The Role of Expected Recovery
The event studies described above demonstrate that material weakness disclosures are informative to CDS investors over a short horizon. An analysis over longer window periods can utilize richer data to investigate the reasons why internal control quality is more relevant in the credit market. Hence we examine the relation between internal control quality and the cost of credit protection over a three-month period after disclosures. We choose the three-month window for our cross-sectional analysis to ensure that the internal control quality information is fully incorporated into prices. 14 14 There are two additional reasons to choose the three-month period after internal control disclosures. First, it is before the release of the next quarterly report that contains the SOX 302 internal control information. Second, for many firms, trading in their CDS contracts, though more active than trading in their bonds, is still sparse, averaging trades over the three-month period could help reduce noise in the data resulting from transitory liquidity issues, as fundamental components in CDS prices move in lower frequencies.
To make a meaningful comparison of CDS spreads between firms with and without MWs, we control for all important factors that affect internal control quality and CDS spreads in crosssectional regressions as suggested by the prior literature (e.g., Ericsson et al. 2009; Callen et al. 2009; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007b; Ge and McVay 2005) :
The control variables are described in the appendix. We use 5-year CDS spreads averaged over the three-month period after internal control disclosures as the dependent variable.
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The 5-year CDS contracts are most popular and actively traded in the market. Our key independent variable is an indicator for whether a company reports material weaknesses (MW=1) or not (MW=0). Our main regression analysis is conducted on a pooled time-series and cross-sectional panel with treatments for fixed effects.
If creditors expect full recovery upon default from the firm, then internal control quality should have a minimal effect on the cost of debt. On the other hand, if the expected recovery upon default is low, creditors will pay acute attention to the information contained in the internal control disclosures. Therefore, we expect the MW-CDS spread relation to be more pronounced among firms with low expected recovery. In Table 3 , We regress Log(CDS SPREAD) on internal control MWs and other control variables, as specified in Equation (1), first in subsamples partitioned by variables related to the expected recovery upon default, then in the full sample.
We first separate the data according to the intensity of intangibles. To the extent that intangibles are difficult for companies to value and manage, the presence of MWs may suggest that the amount creditors can collect from these intangibles is limited. Hence, we expect that CDS spreads are more sensitive to MWs in the companies with high intangible intensity. 15 We present the results with the logarithm of CDS spreads instead of raw CDS spreads due to the skewed distribution of CDS spreads. However, our results using raw CDS spreads are similar.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 show that the relation between CDS spreads and MWs is significant only for the subsample with high intensity of intangibles. The relation between CDS spreads and MWs is insignificant in the subsample with low intensity of intangibles. Moreover, the coefficient difference on MW across the two subsamples is significant at the 5 percent level.
We next use a firm-specific characteristic related to the expected recovery, profit margin, to partition our sample. show that firms with high profit margins have high expected levels of recovery upon default based on historical data. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 show that the effect of MWs on CDS spreads is more pronounced for the subsample with low profit margins than the subsample with high profit margins. Again, the coefficient estimates for MW across those two profit margin groups are statistically significantly different. further classify industries by their historical recovery rates. We use their data and separate our sample by the historical industry recovery rates into high and low recovery groups. Columns (5) and (6) indeed demonstrate that different levels of expected recovery upon default (proxied by historical industry-level recoveries) affect the MW-CDS spread relation differently.
Lastly, in column (7) of full sample analysis, we find that CDS spreads are significantly higher for firms with MWs, consistent with prior studies on credit markets.
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Nevertheless, our results in Table 3 suggest that the MW-CDS relation is mainly driven by firms with creditors' 16 The coefficients on control variables are consistent with theoretical predictions, as the regression results show that CDS spreads are positively associated with return volatility (VOL RET) and leverage (LEVERAGE), consistent with prior studies (e.g., Calen et al. 2009; Ericsson et al. 2009 ). In unreported results, we find that the effects of internal control quality on CDS spreads are robust to alternative sampling approaches and estimation methods. For instance, we follow Callen et al. (2009) and find consistent contract-level evidence. We only include a sample of companies that are covered by rating agencies and find the similar results as in Table 3 , suggesting that the effect of MWs on CDS spreads is beyond the monitoring channel documented by Dhaliwal et al. (2011) . Moreover, we examine the differential effect of directional MW changes by separating ∆MW to remediated ("corrected weaknesses") cases (MW=1 to MW=0), repeated weakness ("uncorrected weaknesses") cases (MW=1 to MW=1), and deterioration cases (MW=0 to MW=1). 
Internal Control Quality and Creditors' Expected Recovery
The evidence presented in the previous section shows that the effect of internal control quality on CDS spreads exists primarily for firms with poor credit ratings or with serious concerns about creditors' expected recovery upon default. In this section we focus on the expected recovery and link it directly to internal control quality. We first identify the expected recovery component from CDS spreads and the expected default frequency (EDF™), the most popular measure of default probability in practice provided by Moody's KMV. We then show that expected recovery is lower for firms with internal control material weaknesses. Further, we
show that the effect is most pronounced for firms with higher bankruptcy risk or when material weaknesses are more severe.
Estimating the Expected Recovery Component from CDS Spreads and EDF
CDS spreads are determined by the expected loss. In a simplistic theoretical framework (e.g., Duffie 1999), the expected loss can be represented as follows:
Expected Loss Probability of Default Loss Given Default.
Loss Given Default (LGD) is the complement of the expected recovery upon default, i.e., the expected recovery with respect to the amount borrowed for creditors when a borrower defaults.
In our main analysis, we decompose CDS spreads into a probability of default (PD) component and an expected recovery component.
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The PD component affects both creditors and equityholders, but the expected recovery component affects creditors only. Therefore, we focus on the expected recovery component.
We need to have a measure of probability of default for the decomposition of CDS spreads. The most popular measure is based on the Merton (1974) model. In this model, the first step to calculate the probability of default is to find the distance-to-default (DD):
where V is asset value, F is debt face value, is expected asset return, is asset volatility, and T is maturity of debt. The calculation is based on observed data on stock price, stock return volatility, and debt face value. PD is then a transformation of DD: PD N DD , where N(•) is the standard normal cumulative probability density function under the assumption of BlackScholes-Merton option pricing framework. The detailed procedure for calculating DD and PD is discussed in Hillegeist et al (2004) and Bharath and Shumway (2008) .
Our probability of default measure is the EDF obtained directly from Moody's KMV, which uses a proprietary historical default database to map DD to EDF. Correia et al. (2011) find that EDF from Moody's KMV provides the best default forecast, and the measure is widely used by practitioners and regulators. Using EDF to represent the default probability component of CDS spreads, we use the following procedure to determine the expected recovery component in the spirit of (2): We first regress Log(CDS Spread) on Log(EDF) and define the unexplained CDS spreads as the expected recovery component: 17 The sum of those two components equals to total CDS spreads. As changes in corporate debt valuation can be due to either the change in cash flow, or the change in discount rate, or both, our probability of default component may be thought of as a discount rate channel while the expected recovery component may be regarded as a cash flow channel.
Log CDS Spread Log EDF Expected Recovery Value Component.
The fitted value Log EDF captures the default probability component of the CDS spreads. We can think of α as related to default risk premium and β as related to the market price of default risk. By construction, the expected recovery component is orthogonal to the default probability component. We run the regression separately for each industry-year group as there is an industry effect in default risk (Chava and Jarrow (2004) We note that high recovery means low recovery component in CDS spreads hence a negative sign for the coefficient estimate. The rank order correlation is higher than above linear regression which also includes industry and year effects. The validation result supports our measure which is significantly correlated with historical recovery rates.
This regression-based reduced-form approach to representing the expected recovery upon default has several advantages. First, the expected recovery component is, by construction, orthogonal to the default probability component. Therefore, we can be assured that our subsequent findings on the expected recovery component are not contaminated by its correlation with default probability component.
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Second, the approach affords much flexibility for our analysis. We can run it for each industry in each year to incorporate industry and macroeconomic effects. Third, the approach is parsimonious and easily executed. We can calculate the expected recovery component based on observed data and do not need any additional estimation.
Notwithstanding our supportive validation results, we use an alternative approach to calculate the expected recovery component to show that our results are not driven by our decomposition procedure. This approach follows more directly the structural model of Merton (1974) in linking EDF to CDS, in contrast to the reduced-form approach in the regression procedure in our decomposition discussed above. We call this a structural approach, which is discussed in detail in Moody's (2010) and Crouhy et al. (2000) . Specifically, according to Moody's (2010) , CDS spreads are determined by EDF and other factors in closed form as follows:
or, according to Crouhy et al. (2000) :
where λ is the risk premium. Since we use 5-year CDS contracts in our analysis, so 5. We first calculate the zero-recovery CDS spread by setting LGD=1 and assume zero risk premium (market price of risk multiplied by asset correlation with market). Therefore the zero-recovery CDS spread is ln 1 EDF /5 EDF/5. This approximation is very good when EDF is small (e.g., smaller than 100 basis points). Our results are similar when we calculate risk premium and correlations from equity returns. We do not include risk premium to avoid the complication of using equity data which are needed to proxy for asset correlation and returns. This zero-recovery CDS spread is higher than the actual CDS spread, the log difference of these two spreads represents the expected recovery component of CDS spreads, as indicated in (5). This alternative measure is not necessary orthogonal to default probability. It should be noted that a higher value for the expected recovery component from those estimations indicates lower expected recovery.
The Positive Relation between Expected Recovery and Internal Control Quality
We use the expected recovery measures to test the relationship between the expected recovery component of CDS spreads and internal control quality (MW indicator) as discussed previously in Subsection 2.3:
Again, control variables are defined in Appendix. The regression results are reported in Table 4 .
The dependent variable is the regression-based measure of the expected recovery component (the reduced-form approach) for the left panel and the log difference between the zero-recovery CDS spread and the actual CDS spread (structural approach) for the right panel. We include industry and year fixed effects in the regressions so that the industry-year specific regression model fitting results will not drive our results in this second stage.
The left panel full regression with control variables (Column (2)) shows that the expected recovery component of the CDS spread is 16.7% (t-stat=2.02) higher for firms with internal control material weaknesses than firms without, i.e., firms with sound internal control have 16.7%
higher expected recovery value, on average, than firms with MWs. This effect is robust to controlling for other variables. The coefficient for ranked Z-score (RZSCORE) is insignificant, which is expected as the expected recovery component is orthogonal to default probability.
Larger firms have higher expected recovery rates, consistent with prior studies. In addition, firms with write-offs have lower expected recovery.
The estimation results from the structural approach for the expected recovery, shown in the right panel of Table 4 , provide similar findings on the internal control quality effect: The expected recovery is higher for firms without internal control MWs. This regression sample is slightly smaller due to the calculation procedure. Adjusted R 2 is higher for the structural approach than the reduced-form approach (0.5486 in Column (4) versus 0.2744 in Column (2)).
A lower adjusted R 2 is more consistent with prior findings that recovery rates are difficult to explain (Chava et al. 2011) , and with our previous discussion that for the structural approach, the expected recovery component is not necessarily orthogonal to the default probability component of CDS spreads. This is also demonstrated by the fact that the structural measure of the expected recovery is significantly related to stock return volatility, ranked Z-score, and term slope. These results suggest that the regression-based reduced-form approach of identifying the expected recovery component should be our primary method. Thus, we choose to report our results using the expected recovery component under the reduced form approach afterwards.
Our finding on the relation between internal control quality and the expected recovery is robust. We have used the recovery component fraction of the total CDS spread and found similar results (untabulated). In the following subsections, we investigate potential variations in and possible mechanisms for the effect of internal control quality on the expected recovery.
Effect of Bankruptcy Risk on the Expected Recovery-MW Relation
Internal control quality may affect creditors' expected recovery because bankruptcy costs could be higher in the presence of internal control MWs. It is conceivable that for a firm with
MWs, the restructuring process would be lengthy, and it is more difficult for creditors to assess the firm's true asset value and its future prospects. Further, the presence of MWs may exacerbate the deb holder-equity holder conflicts, as discussed before. Moreover, legal fees could be higher as well, eroding the expected recovery for creditors. However, for firms that are far from default, the consideration of creditors' expected recovery may be secondary to the consideration of default probability. Therefore, we conjecture that the effect of internal control quality on the expected recovery should be more pronounced for firms with higher levels of default risk.
We use the default probability component from the reduced-form approach to separate sample into a high default risk group (above median) and a low default risk group (below median). Our results are similar when we use other ways to measure default risk. We then run the baseline regression in Equation (7) for those two sub-samples. Within each group, the default risk is at a comparable level. Therefore, our expected recovery analysis in this part can be considered as conditioning on default risk. Results are reported in Table 5 .
Among firms with high default risk, those with internal control MWs have on average an expected recovery value that is 22.4% higher than that of firms without MWs, as shown in the left panel of Table 5 . This result is statistically significant with a t-statistic of 2.39. In contrast, the effect of internal control MWs on expected recovery is insignificant for low default risk firms, as shown in the right panel. These contrasting results are consistent with our conjecture that material weaknesses would affect the recovery value when a firm is more likely to go bankrupt.
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Two additional results for high default risk firms are worth mentioning. Among high default risk firms, the expected recovery is higher for those employing big auditor, but lower for those with a recent write-off. However, these results do not hold for low default risk firms, as seen from the comparison of Column (2) and Column (4). These results imply that firms facing high default risk could improve auditing quality to mitigate the adverse effect from internal control material weaknesses.
The strong results from high default risk firms are consistent with Callen et al. (2009) and other studies on the debt market response to MW disclosures. While others, e.g., Dhaliwal et al. (2011) , argue that external monitoring is an important determinant, our analysis provides a new perspective that the differential reaction of the debt market to MW disclosures, especially from those firms with high default risk, is intrinsically linked to creditors' expectations of recovery upon default.
Severity of Internal Control MWs
When a firm is in distress, shareholders may transfer assets out of the reach of creditors.
Hence, the shareholder-creditor conflict, which is most intensified when the firm is near or in bankruptcy, may help us understand the mechanism for the effect of internal control quality on creditors' expected recovery upon default. Because not all material weaknesses disclosed by companies are of the same nature, conceivably, it is easier for equity-holders to misappropriate firm assets when internal control material weakness is more severe. Therefore, we hypothesize that the effect of internal control quality on the expected recovery should be strongest for firms with the most severe MWs.
We follow Doyle et al. (2007a, b) and classify material weaknesses into two different types. Some internal control MWs are related to specific accounts and transactions. This type of
MWs can be easily mitigated by auditors with additional procedures (i.e., more substantial tests).
Those MWs are categorized as "account-specific" material weaknesses. Other material weaknesses, however, are associated with a firm's overall control environment or financial reporting process. Such systematic weaknesses could have a pervasive and permanent effect on the quality of financial reporting. Such MWs are categorized as "company-level" material weaknesses. Debt market analysts may regard company-level material weaknesses as more severe than account-specific material weaknesses. Earlier studies find that company-level internal control weaknesses relate to several measures of information uncertainty (e.g., earnings quality, management forecast accuracy) to a greater extent than do account-specific material weaknesses (e.g., Doyle et al. 2007a; Feng et al. 2009 ). Therefore, we expect that company-level material weaknesses have a larger impact on creditors' expected recovery than account-specific material weaknesses.
The severity of MWs may have differential effects on the default probability component and the recovery rate component. The analysis of Duffie and Lando (2001) implies that internal control quality affects default probability due to information uncertainty, but the effect on the expected recovery upon default, which is of greater concern to credit investors than to stock investors, is less straightforward. The prediction of default probability depends more critically on the correct model than the prediction of recovery value (Chava et al. 2011) . Therefore, both types of MWs may affect the default probability component while the expected recovery value component may only respond to the more severe company-level MWs, which could exacerbate the agency conflict between shareholders and creditors. Table 6 presents regression results on how the expected recovery component, the default probability component, as well as the overall CDS spreads, are affected by company-level and account-specific internal control weaknesses. Column (1) Column (2) shows results with the default probability component as the dependent variable. Both account-specific MWs and company-level MWs are significantly positively associated with the default probability component of CDS spreads. There is no statistically significant difference in the effect of these two types of MWs. This finding is in contrast to the results in column (1) on the expected recovery component.
Column (3) uses the logarithm of CDS SPREAD as the dependent variable. It shows that the coefficient on company-level material weaknesses is positive at the one-percent significance level while the coefficient on account-specific material weaknesses is insignificant, suggesting that the association between CDS spreads and internal control weaknesses are mainly driven by company-level internal control weaknesses. Reporting company-level material weaknesses is associated with 64% (=exp(0.495)-1) higher CDS spreads. The difference in coefficients between the company-level and account-specific material weaknesses effects is -0.381 (t-stat=-2.39), which is significant at the one-percent level. The findings on different types of MWs are consistent between column (3) and column (1), suggesting that the differential effects of MW severity on CDS spreads appear to result from their differential effects on the expected recovery component.
Our results suggest that credit investors take the severity of weaknesses into account as they form expectations of default probability and recovery upon default and price CDS contracts accordingly. This finding is consistent with our conjecture and reinforces our baseline results.
Conclusions
We investigate the impact of internal control quality on creditors' expected recovery upon default. We take advantage of the CDS transactions and EDF data in our analysis and focus on the role of the expected recovery in order to understand the differential response to internal control disclosures in equity and debt markets. Creditors' expected recovery is higher for firms with high quality internal control, and this result holds significantly only for high default risk firms, as the consideration for recovery upon default becomes more material for creditors. Our findings about the role of different severity of MWs are consistent with the conjecture that systematic company-level MWs are more ominous for creditors of high default risk firms, leading to their lower expectations of recovery upon default.
This is the first study to examine the role of creditors' expected recovery in understanding the relation between internal control quality and the cost of capital. We provide a new perspective on the impact of the SOX 404 on a firm's cost of capital. Our paper highlights the importance of considering the unique payoff structure for debt holders when examining the relevance of financial information. There is a growing interest in using CDS spreads for empirical accounting research given the increasing importance of this derivative market. Our approach to estimating the expected recovery components of CDS spreads with CDS transaction data and EDF could be useful for future credit market studies. 
Appendix: Variable Definitions

SEG
The log of one plus the sum of the number of business and geographic segments reported for the firm in year t (Data Source: Compustat Segment Data).
FOREIGN
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has a non-zero foreign currency transaction in year t, and 0 otherwise (Compustat item FCA).
M&A Proportion of the current and prior four years that a firm is involved in merger & acquisition activities (Compustat items SALE_FN).
RESTRUCTURE
Proportion of the current and prior four years (year t, t-1, t-2, t-3, and t-4) that a firm is involved in restructuring activities (Compustat items RCP, RCA, RCEPS, and RCD).
SALE GROWTH Average sales growth in the past five years as (Compustat item SALE) in the current and previous four years (year t, t-1, t-2, t-3, and t-4).
BM Book-to-market ratio as (Compustat items CEQ/(PRCC_F×CSHO)) at the end of year t.
INVENTORY
Inventory scaled by total assets (Compustat items INVT/AT) at the end of year t.
SIZE
The log of total assets at the end of year t (Compustat item: AT).
% LOSS Proportion of the current and prior four years (year t, t-1, t-2, t-3, and t-4) that a firm reports negative earnings (Compustat item: NI). t-values are in parentheses ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively. See the appendix for variable definitions. We separate the sample by the median value of the CDS default probability component. The CDS default probability component is the predicted value in regressing Log (CDS SPREAD) on Log(EDF) in each industry-year group, and the CDS expected recovery component is the unexplained part by EDF from the regression of Log(CDS SPREAD) on Log(EDF) in each industry-year group as described in section 4.1. This table reports regression results with the expected recovery component, default probability component, and overall CDS spreads on the severity of internal control material weakness. The dependent variables are the expected recovery component and the default probability component of CDS spreads using the reduced-form approach as described in section 4.1, as well Log(CDS SPREAD). T-statistics are in parenthesis. ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
